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I agree with you that the question of determinism or indeterminism doesn't really have anything to do with the free will debate. You might like Dan Dennett's books on the subject, Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves. The latter is longer and more up to date.

Posted by: Jacob at January 17, 2007 5:06 PM

I agree with much you are saying. You can't have a free will without EXISTING - and if you can only exist today because nature functions the way it does, this does not contradict free will, whether nature is deterministic or not.

Posted by: mogmich at January 18, 2007 1:21 AM

"There are no coincidences in this world, only the illusion of coincidence."
-V

I don't really understand what you mean by the last paragraph. The YOU are still YOU part and YOUR choices are still YOUR choices whether or not they could have been predicted.

But I do think that begs a bigger question, and probably the question that this is getting to, and that is - without free will, without independence on external deterministic forces, can there really be a ME? If I am not an independent being, what is there to differentiate ME from YOU besides the fact that we are made up of different atoms, with different brains with different chemical compositions, which cause us to (perhaps predictably) choose different actions and experience different thoughts?

I guess that might be why I CHOOSE to like the idea in the Tao Te Ching (I don't care if its true or not on any level, I just like it)that the more you can let go of the idea that you are this thing that is separate from everything and everyone else, and the more you can realize that you are a part of the same thing as everyone else, and that your happiness is tied to theirs, the easier your existence will be. That idea is also in The Fountain.

What does it mean that hope is as hollow as fear?
Hope and fear are both phantoms
that arise from thinking of the self.
When we do not see the self as self,
what do we have to fear?

Posted by: Chris Santoro at January 18, 2007 10:25 AM

In response to Barzelay.... I agree with your post here, and I think you made an excellent point. As a free will skeptic myself, I similarly don't see how the whole uncertainty principle in science proves free will; it simply fails to prove determinism. Also, I liked your other points about how free will skepticism is mostly irrelevant to how one goes about living. Intellectually, I may not believe in free will as a philosophical doctrine, but that doesn't mean I don't regard myself as "making choices" the same way everyone else does.

In response to Chris Santoro.... You ask, "without free will, without independence on external deterministic forces, can there really be a ME? If I am not an independent being, what is there to differentiate ME from YOU besides the fact that we are made up of different atoms, with different brains with different chemical compositions, which cause us to (perhaps predictably) choose different actions and experience different thoughts?"

In my opinion, there's no contradiction in imagining that one could still exist as an independent entity even without free will. Without free will, you could still exist as a sentient being who's having a bunch of subjective experiences. As long as those experiences are YOURS and YOURS alone, then that still counts as independent existence, regardless of whether those experiences are predetermined and regardless of whether you have any control over them.

Posted by: Phil at January 18, 2007 2:00 PM

Mogmich - Suppose nature functioned a different way. Would that change the way we ought to act? I think it would not.

Chris - "...what is there to differentiate ME from YOU besides the fact that we are made up of different atoms, with different brains with different chemical compositions, which cause us to (perhaps predictably) choose different actions and experience different thoughts?"

Well, without all of those things? Probably not much. But you just excluded a whole lot of stuff. Who says those things--our brains and choices--collectively, I would call those things our subjective experience... who says those things aren't important distinctions? But certainly I agree that everything in the world is in some way intertwined, and that that fact should influence us in the way we act.

My point was just that, if we remove the question of whether or not we are avoiding Hell, then there is no external place that free will matters. It's a totally subjective question. It's a question not only arising only in thought, but whose scope is also limited to thought.

Posted by: Barzelay at January 18, 2007 2:31 PM

I don't agree with Barzelay in both points.

The first (why is QM supporting freedom) is very simple: without QM determinism is true, and there would be no way to think about free will, it just doesn't exist.

With the QM you can see the existence of indeterministic events. This is not, obviously, a proof of the existence of free will (if you want to proove freedom you are "wanting" so you assume that you are free; you will never be able to proove freedom) but only a possibility to view the world with freedom.

The second point is very interesting.
You say that also in a deterministic world you could feel free and you idea of freedom would be respected.
I agree with Chris: If you are determined there is no reason to distinguish between me and you. You are only a big mountain of atoms. You are exactly like a cat, like a tree, like a stone. The only difference is the form of your matter.
Your choices are not choice decided by you, but only a consequence of what you also could have seen before. If you say that alse this kind of acting is free, well also a ball rolling is free to roll: the cause of its rolling is visible and its way of rolling is predictable, so it's free.
I don't think you can imagine a world like this.

There is a second problem with your view: how can you imagine the laws? Why do you say that somebody is guilty of an homicide? He couldn't do anything other than that, so he didn't have any other possibility, he only could kill this person, and you (or some hypothetical daemon) were also able to predict it!
So laws would not make sense.
I think is better to view a world with freedom, and safer... :-)

You might like to read some questions and see some presentations in the blog scienceandbeyond.

Posted by: Lorenzo at January 19, 2007 4:04 AM

Lorenzo,

without QM determinism is true, and there would be no way to think about free will, it just doesn't exist.

I think determinism and free will are not mutually exclusive. If you provide your definition of free will, perhaps I could address your argument more directly. Also, you seem very much to like indeterminacy and free will. What do you think about this new theory that a deterministic world underlies that of quantum mechanics? What if there becomes consensus in the scientific community that it is true? Will you take comfort in the possibility that, as I speculated in the post, another indeterminate world will be discovered underlying that one? Will you simply refuse to believe that determinism is true, even if science points the other way? If so, why?

If you are determined there is no reason to distinguish between me and you. You are only a big mountain of atoms. You are exactly like a cat, like a tree, like a stone... If you say that alse this kind of acting is free, well also a ball rolling is free to roll: the cause of its rolling is visible and its way of rolling is predictable, so it's free.

I agree. We are no different from cats and trees, except in one respect (and I can't even confirm that this isn't the case except for with humans--or, if you want to be really particular about it, except for myself): we have a subjective experience. For less intelligent entities, there simply is no subjective experience. What I'm arguing is that the subjective experience of free will is free will. And it is so even if we know the world to be deterministic. In some sense, it's perfectly reasonable to talk about the ball to have free will, but its free will is limited by its ability to will. It isn't intelligent enough to want anything, nor even to care about anything. In a similar way, our will is limited by our ability. I want to write the greatest novel ever, resolve every mathematical paradox, and sing beautifully. But my will to do those things is limited by the fact that I haven't worked hard enough, am not intelligent enough, and have a terrible voice. My free will consists in making rational decisions about how I can use my abilities and the circumstances into which I am placed in order to maximize my own aesthetic pleasure and the pleasure of other humans. The fact that I don't have the ability to do what I really want to do doesn't change the fact that I have free will. No doubt there are pleasures far greater than any I can even conceive. So my will itself is limited. But I still have it. A rock does not. But not because there is a qualitative difference, only because the rock does not possess even a limited ability to will (on even the lowest level: survival). Life is a prerequisite for will.

how can you imagine the laws? Why do you say that somebody is guilty of an homicide? He couldn't do anything other than that, so he didn't have any other possibility, he only could kill this person, and you (or some hypothetical daemon) were also able to predict it!

You are keen to point out this problem. In fact, I think many people share this concern with our criminal justice system even without believing in determinism. Even if we do have free will, we are still limited and affected in some way by our surroundings. People who grow up in bad environments will have a lot tougher time growing up to be good members of society (how we define 'good members of society' is left an open question). Similarly, people born Hindu will have quite a tough time finding Baby Jesus. I, and many other people, have a very big problem with the way our criminal justice system holds people accountable for things that they may have been driven to do by poverty, addiction, or a violent environment. And the problem of the Hindus finding Jesus was the first doubt that set me on my path to atheism. So, like I said, you're right to point out this problem, and I cannot refute it. It remains a problematic area for me.

Posted by: Barzelay at January 19, 2007 4:31 AM

I'm very interested in this new theorie about determinism at su-quantum level. I will study this issue.

it's perfectly reasonable to talk about the ball to have free will, but its free will is limited by its ability to will. It isn't intelligent enough to want anything, nor even to care about anything. In a similar way, our will is limited by our ability.

I think it's true to say that our freedom is limited to our ability. We cannot go through a wall, even if we are wanting to do that...
But even if you are limited by some material rules, you have a list of possibilities. You cannot go through a wall and you cannot do many other things, but you still have the possibility to run or to walk, to sing or to speak, to say yes or to say no. So if you are thinking in a deterministic way, you have to agree with the fact that all these choices are predecided. So if you say yes is not because of your inability to say no, but because you had no possibility to say something else but yes. If you were able to calculate all the variables you could predict it!

So you are not limited in your choices, but you only have a way to behave. And this is exactly the same as what a rock can do. It also doesn't have the ability to will (you're right) but finally it has only one possibility, like human beings.

So with determinism there is no way to say that you are a man thinking and making decisions.

This lead to the problem of the laws: if you are exactly the same as a tree or a rock, how can I say that you are more responsible for the homicide than the rock which you threw against the man? You will have a non-sense!

I think therefore that is better to accept freedom, and we finally can do it (I'm still interested in this new theorie) without contradtiction with science.

My conclusion is that is possible to think a world of freedom. And this is also more useful than other visions.

Posted by: Lorenzo at January 19, 2007 9:12 AM

"Predecided" does not mean "not free" to me. Explain how you define "freedom" and "free."

Posted by: Barzelay at January 19, 2007 9:35 AM

You are free if you can choose between more possibilities.

Freedom is the state which you are in when you are free.

Posted by: Lorenzo at January 19, 2007 12:03 PM

But we can, and do choose between many possibilities. I don't see how your definition of freedom is incompatible with determinism.

Posted by: Barzelay at January 19, 2007 6:24 PM

Just to throw a wild idea out there.... Determinism doesn't necessarily negate the justification for a working legal system if you take a utilitarian approach. Having punishments is still a psychological deterrent to crime, even in a deterministic world, and deterring crime is justified for the greater good of society. Admittedly, it's a rather creepy way of looking at it, but it's still a decent argument.

Posted by: Phil at January 20, 2007 12:46 AM

No, I think we can't choose in a deterministic world: it's what I tried to say before (my english is very awful I know..).

If you see the process behind a decision, (with det.) you will see only a chain of phenomena, this is also what Kant said. And a chain of phenomena means, that you could see all the elements of the chain, and then predict what the result will be.

It means that you are limited to only one possibility: which is exactly the result of the calculous you could have done.

Phil: Having punishments is still a psychological deterrent to crime
With this sentence you are in contradiction with yourself: You are stating that punishing is a deterrent, so you are assuming that people are free and can choose between crime or no crime.
But if they're not free it's a non-sense to create a deterrent, because people will always kill without wanting it (I don't know if you can say this sentence like that...).

This is why I think (if you have the possibility) is better to choose that freedom exists. But of course we have to prove that its existence is possible: and we can do that with QM.

Posted by: Lorenzo at January 20, 2007 10:23 AM

Lorenzo said, "You are stating that punishing is a deterrent, so you are assuming that people are free and can choose between crime or no crime."

Not necessarily. I'm stating that the threat of punishment simply makes it more likely that people will deterministically avoid crime. Determinism just says that people are caused to make their choices by the totality of all factors affecting them. The threat of punishment can be seen as one of these factors.

I'm saying that if criminal punishment exists, then ones who avoid crime might have been predetermined to avoid it because the fear of punishment, in combination with all other psychological factors affecting them, inevitably caused them to avoid it. Deterrence doesn't require free will.

Posted by: Phil at January 20, 2007 11:26 AM

+1 Phil.

Posted by: Barzelay at January 21, 2007 12:58 AM

I agree with you Phil.
Now I understood what you meant before and you are right.

But I am still convinced that determinism is incompatible with freedom.

If quantum theory is correct, as it seems to be, you can choose freedom or determinism (in a strange way: manyworlds), and I am sure that is better to choose the first.

What can you say for example about the sense of your life?

Posted by: Lorenzo at January 21, 2007 1:17 PM

I think it's still possible, as Barzelay talked about originally, to believe in determinism intellectually but still live as though your choices are meaningful. No matter what any of us believe about the determinism question, the fact remains that we are faced with choices-- choices that must be made, choices that will shape our lives. For all practical purposes, we are "responsible" for what we choose because the consequences of those choices will affect us (not to mention the effect they will have on others), whether it was all predetermined or not.

I would agree with you that it's bad to act as though you have no responsibility for your choices. But I don't necessarily think that type of mindset follows automatically from a belief in determinism.

Posted by: Phil at January 21, 2007 3:57 PM

On a slightly separate subject....

It seems like our society and legal system, while leaning heavily toward the traditional free will paradigm (western culture is, after all, rooted in Judeo-Christian philosophy, which includes the belief in free will), also gives some weight to the determinism paradigm as well.

Free will seems to be the default assumption of the legal system-- people are assumed to have free will when they commit a crime, enter into a contract, violate a tort duty, or consent to something legally relevant. However, the current legal system also seems to assume determinism in certain situations. Insanity is the best example. Duress is another. "Diminished capacity" almost seems like a compromise between the traditional free will paradigm and the determinism paradigm.

It's almost as though there is a tension between modern psychology and neuroscience (which supports determinism) and Judeo-Christian philosophy (which supports free will), and this tension is playing out more and more in the legal system.

Posted by: Phil at January 21, 2007 4:31 PM

I would argue that none of those doctrines have much to do with determinism. The insanity defense has everything to do with lack of mens rea. "The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty."

Posted by: Barzelay at January 21, 2007 5:35 PM

But the concept of mens rea is based on the traditional Judeo-Christian free will paradigm-- the whole idea that humans are free moral agents who can choose between good and evil. Insanity is considered an exception to that: an insane person is not regarded as having "freely chosen" evil. Also, the insanity defense employs a deterministic way of looking at human behavior. That's why defense witnesses often include psychiatrists and mental health professionals who testify about the defendant's mental state, brain chemistry, etc. and who appeal to the scientific/deterministic outlook (which says that actions follow forth inevitably from the totality of causal factors).

Posted by: Phil at January 21, 2007 6:20 PM

Your argument is assuming that determinism is the opposite of free will. I agree that mens rea is based on the traditional Judeo-Christian idea of free will. But as I've said, I don't think determinism is antithetical to that idea.

Insanity, I think, has nothing to do with determinism. The expert witnesses don't testify that it was inevitable that the defendant acted as he did, only that the defendant did not have the requisite mental capacity for his actions to be those of a guilty mind. It doesn't mean that he "had" to act that way.

Posted by: Barzelay at January 21, 2007 7:50 PM

I do think determinism is the opposite of the traditional Judeo-Christian idea of free will. The latter holds that people are free to choose between good and evil, are morally accountable for their actions, and that when they do something, it was possible for them to have done otherwise. Determinism holds that human choices are subject to the same rules of necessary causation as everything else in the natural world, that people's actions are the inevitable product of brain chemistry and psychological factors, and that people therefore cannot have any true "moral accountability" for what they do-- at least not in the traditional, commonly understood sense.

In my opinion, the insanity defense strongly implies determinism. The expert witnesses don't just testify that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state for criminal guilt. They testify that the defendant lacked such a mental state BECAUSE of his psychiatric/neurological problems, which strongly implies a deterministic way of seeing things ("Psych factors caused him to lose his freedom to choose between good and evil.").

Posted by: Phil at January 22, 2007 2:50 PM

But that view didn't come to dominate Judeo-Christianity until the 16th century. Prior to that, Calvinism, and before then, Gnosticism didn't necessarily agree at all with current Christian views on free will vs. predestination.

[Free will] holds that people are free to choose between good and evil, are morally accountable for their actions, and that when they do something, it was possible for them to have done otherwise. Determinism holds that ... that people's actions are the inevitable product of brain chemistry and psychological factors, and that people therefore cannot have any true "moral accountability" for what they do-- at least not in the traditional, commonly understood sense.

I still don't think you've drawn a meaningful difference there, but it's probably just because each of us are using fairly poor terms. You are right, however, that the two are quite different in the "commonly understood sense" but that common view is precisely what I was trying to subvert with this post.

And I just totally disagree about the insanity defense. Not everyone who has psych problems commits crimes, and the expert witnesses don't testify that the crimes were inevitable, nor that the defendants had no choice. They aren't held accountable for the same reason small children aren't held criminally accountable. Though they had a choice, they did not have enough rational intelligence for that choice to be one society is willing to recognize as punishable by our legal system.

Posted by: Barzelay at January 23, 2007 12:43 AM

I think you're right in that we both may be stuck in sort of a Wittgensteinian language game over certain terms. Let me try to clarify: When I refer to the "traditional" Judeo-Christian free will concept, I'm referring to the more modern (relatively speaking) one, the one that is post-Calvinist, post-16th century.

I guess I'm talking about the more commonly understood sense of both free will and determinism because it's usually the loose stew of common views that shape culture, and with it, the legal system. Although I'd agree that such views are often inconsistent and vulnerable to intellectual attack.

"Not everyone who has psych problems commits crimes, and the expert witnesses don't testify that the crimes were inevitable, nor that the defendants had no choice. They aren't held accountable for the same reason small children aren't held criminally accountable. Though they had a choice, they did not have enough rational intelligence for that choice to be one society is willing to recognize as punishable by our legal system."

You're thinking only of the M'Naghten test. What about the Irresistible Impulse test? That's clearly about the defendant not having a choice. Also, consider the Durham test, an insanity rule that refers to causation in its very definition (the crime was the product of, and therefore was caused by, mental disease or defect, which further implies that the crime was inevitable-- a clear suggestion of determinism).

I'd argue that even the M'Naghten rule, even if it has nothing to do with determinism or the lack of behavioral control, is still about refuting an element of Judeo-Christian (post-Calvinist) free will. It refutes the element of moral agency, if not the element of freedom. An insane person, by M'Naghten standards, is said not to have known the wrongfulness of his act (contradicting the Judeo-Christian idea that God gave humans free will and the power to distinguish good from evil).

Also, I'll still have to fight you on the expert testimony issue, even when M'Naghten is the standard. When defense psychiatrists get up and talk about how the defendant was psychotic at the time, they are at least strongly implying that the defendant had no choice (even if that's not the ultimate point of their testimony). Most people would not regard those in the grip of psychosis to have the same amount of control over their behavior as everyone else.

Posted by: Phil at January 23, 2007 10:06 AM

Just one more tidbit to clarify something I said. When I said, "An insane person, by M'Naghten standards, is said not to have known the wrongfulness of his act," I meant that he didn't understand cognitively what he was doing and thus couldn't be aware of its unlawfulness (which still negates his power to "distinguish good from evil" from the Judeo-Christian perspective).

Posted by: Phil at January 23, 2007 10:30 AM

You make some interesting points, and you clearly know more about the insanity defense than I do. I suppose that you're right that, at the very least, the insanity defense, in taking away culpable agency, has something to do with determinism. Anyway, thanks for all the insights. I think I'm going to leave this discussion where it is now.

Posted by: Barzelay at January 23, 2007 2:07 PM

You're welcome. Thanks for having the discussion with me. You've definitely forced me to think more carefully about these issues.

Posted by: Phil at January 23, 2007 5:52 PM